That is the second half (I) of our sequence wanting on the construction of the Carthaginian military. As we mentioned final time, whereas Carthage has an unfair status for being an ‘un-military’ society, its navy system was one of many highest performing within the historic Mediterranean, in a position to produce huge and efficient armies waging battle on a number of fronts for extended intervals.
Final time we surveyed the elements of that navy after which took a better take a look at the position of Carthaginian citizen troopers. What we famous was that Carthaginian citizen troopers fashioned an essential a part of Carthage’s armies early in its historical past, and in its final decade, however at its top had been usually not embody in ‘expeditionary’ Carthaginian armies. I supposed that it is because Carthaginian citizen troopers had their service restricted to Carthage’s North African homeland – as a result of nearly each time we achieve visibility into Carthage’s wars there, we see citizen troopers – however the proof for that is extraordinarily restricted. What issues for us is that by the third century, Carthaginian residents now not make up a major quantity of Carthage’s navy power exterior of North Africa (although a handful nonetheless function officers).
That after all results in the query: if Carthaginians weren’t the bedrock basis of Carthage’s armies, who was? And this week, we’ll get to that reply, wanting on the forces Carthage drew from North Africa. Our sources time period them mercenaries, however we now have greater than sufficient cause to doubt that.
However first, as all the time, elevating giant armies of mercenaries, topic conscripts, vassal warlords and allies is dear! In case you too need to assist me invade Italy with a multi-ethnic military of various origins in a doomed effort to cease the Roman Republic, you may assist by supporting this challenge over at Patreon. If you need updates at any time when a brand new put up seems or need to hear my extra bite-sized musings on historical past, safety affairs and present occasions, you may observe me on Bluesky (@bretdevereaux.bsky.social). I’m additionally energetic on Threads (bretdevereaux) and preserve a de minimis presence on Twitter (@bretdevereaux).
Conscripting Africans
Returning briefly to our schematic of the Carthaginian military in 215, the second largest single element of Carthage’s roughly 160,000 males below arms in that yr had been 50,000 African infantry, joined by not less than 11,000 African and Numidian cavalry. We’ll talk about the Numidians subsequent week for causes that will likely be clear then. However it’s clear that the spine of Carthage’s armies had been these African squaddies.
Our Latin sources (like Livy) time period these fellows Afri, ‘Africans,’ whereas our Greek sources, like Diodorus and Polybius, will name usually them λίβυες, ‘Libyans,’ although we should be clear right here that almost all of those males are coming from what at present is Tunisia, slightly than Libya. On the finish of the First Punic Conflict, Polybius notes that these males made up the most important a part of Carthage’s military, returning in defeat from Sicily (Polyb. 1.67.7) and as famous above they’re current in substantial numbers in Carthage’s armies within the Second Punic Conflict. It’s hardly the primary time for these fellows, although: North Africans are reported in Carthage’s armies from the Battle of Himera on ahead.
I ought to notice, I’m going to fairly persistently name these fellows from right here on in ‘Africans’ or ‘North Africans.’ First off, it is rather clear that when our Greek sources say λίβυες, they imply the identical factor as our Latin sources saying Afri (certainly, usually in instances the place Livy is simply straight up translating passages of Polybius with solely modest embroidering, the equivalence is obvious); these are simply two completely different languages’ phrases for a similar individuals. However I feel ‘Africans’ could also be extra useful right here for the fashionable reader for 2 causes: first, most of Carthage’s African infantry doesn’t come from the territory of the fashionable nation of Libya; most of them come from what at present is Tunisia, so one doesn’t need to give the inaccurate sense that these troops are ‘Libyan’ within the fashionable sense of the nation of Libya (a few of them are, however most usually are not). Second, I feel ‘African’ additionally provides a way of the broader notion of those fellows as primarily being from Africa – some are indigenous Berbers, some are Phoenician settlers, some are of combined heritage and – to go by current DNA research – some are possible settlers of Aegean extraction, who’ve considerably adopted Punic (=Phoenician) tradition. In order that they’re all Africans within the sense that they dwell in Africa (each within the fashionable sense of the continent and the traditional sense of the area round Carthage), however a comparatively various group.
Our reception of those troops is, alas, I feel fairly badly bent by Polybius who – in driving a few of his personal arguments – permits some crucial misconceptions to fester in his writing. Polybius, as a supply, is normally comparatively reliable, however whereas Polybius will nearly by no means lie to you, he’ll usually let you imagine issues that aren’t strictly talking true – Polybius is a grasp of ‘mendacity with the reality,’ because it had been and that is one case.
We’ve truly mentioned this earlier than, however to recap briefly: Polybius describes Carthage’s African troops as μισθοφόροι, misthophoroi, which has a broad that means (‘wage-bearing, wage-receiving’) and a slim that means (‘mercenary’) and right here, as in a number of different locations, Polybius is comfortable to be technically right with the primary that means after which let the reader assume the second that means (which is incorrect). That’s as a result of Polybius appears to be – we don’t have all of his work, however this appears to be a thread of it – arguing for the prevalence of citizen troopers over mercenaries in an effort to get the Greeks of his personal day to reform their very own militaries to rely extra on the previous than the latter. Carthage thus gives a possibility for Polybius to drive his ‘mercenaries are dangerous’ argument and he does so, fudging the terminology as mandatory.
As a result of Polybius is mostly so trusted, that has led generations of students to carelessly assume that Carthage’s armies – and their North African elements – had been mercenary in nature, however that assumption is broadly incorrect.
As a substitute, Diodorus Siculus provides us a outstanding image of Carthaginian recruitment within the early 400s, describing Carthaginian musters in 410 and 406. In 410 (Diod. Sic. 13.44.6), the Carthaginian muster has three phases: first there may be mercenary recruitment in Spain – signaled by the phrase ξενολογεῖν, xenologein ‘to recruit foreigners.’ Then Carthaginian residents are mustered with καταγράφειν, katagraphein, ‘to put in writing down, register, document.’ If that appears an odd method to muster somebody, it has the identical fundamental that means and etymology as our personal ‘conscript’ which comes from con+scriptus, ‘to put in writing collectively.’ We truly use the identical idioms, we’ve simply forgotten that we do: somebody who’s conscripted is written down (in a listing of troopers), somebody who ‘enrolls’ or is ‘enrolled’ within the navy is being added to the roll (listing) of names. So we might say Carthaginian troopers listed here are being enrolled. Lastly, Carthage’s North African topics are mustered with ἐπιλέγειν, epilegein, ‘picked out, known as by identify.’
That final phrase is putting, as a result of that isn’t a strategy of taking volunteers: the North African troops are being picked, on this case by Carthage’s generals. Within the muster of 406 (Diod. Sic. 13.80.1-4), Diodorus shifts his vocabulary a bit and this time it’s the Africans who’re katagraphein‘d into the military, this time explicitly by Carthaginian generals who head out into non-Carthaginian North African topic communities to conscript troopers. Briefly these troopers are paid conscripts, serving (as we’ll see) lengthy phrases, their recruitment presumably a part of the deal Carthage imposed on topic North African communities.
I ought to notice that older scholarship usually supposed that maybe this method was later superceded, that Carthage could have stopped conscripting Africans and as a substitute imposed harsher taxes and began hiring mercenaries. This could make Polybius proper, however the issue is that no supply says this and as famous earlier than, it isn’t mandatory both: Polybius is usually slippery with the time period misthophoros. Consequently, fashionable students are likely to reject this argument and as a substitute view Carthage’s African infantry within the third century (that’s, through the Punic and Mercenary Wars) as paid conscripts slightly than volunteer mercenaries. And I feel that’s most likely right, that these are troops levied from Carthage’s North African dependencies – most likely with a mixture of incentives and compulsion – who’re then paid for his or her continued service and loyalty.
When it comes to the make-up of those communities, they had been clearly a combination: a few of these are Phoenician colonial foundations, whereas others had been indigenous Libyan cities, whose inhabitants would have been broadly Berber. When it comes to the incoming settlers, current genetic work has prompt that Phoenician colonization drew very extensively, with Punic settlements usually exhibiting loads of Sicilian and Aegean (learn: Greek) inhabitants within the combine too and truly little or no Punic ancestry. That latter level places me a bit on guard, as a result of our sources are very clear that they perceive loads of these populations to be Phoenician (=Punic) by tradition and descent and to have cultural and familial ties again to the Levant and Syria and the fabric tradition archaeology appears to substantiate this. Extra work is clearly going to be mandatory right here: the c. 200 stays analyzed within the above-linked examine is an enormous pattern dimension for this type of work, however might simply be thrown off by one thing so simple as completely different burial practices. That mentioned, we all know there was mixing between the indigenous Berber and settler-colonial populations and our sources generally pick particular teams as being ‘Liby-Phoenician’ (λιβυφοίνικες in Greek; libyphoenices in Latin), ethnically blended teams mixing Phoenician and Berber heritage.
Phrases of Service
Naturally, given our sources, we don’t have a nice window into what the ‘phrases’ of this navy service had been, however there are some things we will sketch out. First, it appears like Carthage equips these troopers out of its personal shops. Appian (Pun. 80) provides the startlingly determine that previous to the Third Punic Conflict (so Carthage has already been stripped of most of its empire by this level!), Carthage turned out 200,000 navy panoplies (that’s, units of kit); the quantity is unquestionably exaggerated, however even a tenth of that quantity would suggest giant state armories in Carthage for sustaining its armies which – provided that Carthaginian residents don’t actually serve exterior of Africa – have to be supposed for this African ‘spine’ power. It might additionally clarify why, when Carthaginian residents do serve, they appear indistinguishable from Carthage’s African levies (e.g. Plut. Tim. 27.5): they’re being outfitted out of the identical armories. So if you wish to know what these guys carried, you may largely lean on the earlier put up for our proof for Carthaginian citizen troops.
Principally, which means Carthage’s African troops served as heavy infantry, like Carthaginian residents did. That’s definitely how Hannibal makes use of them: they’re his heaviest infantry and kind the spine of his military. It additionally explains why they might loot Roman heavy infantry gear and finally reequip alongside these strains with out a critical change in how they fought (Polyb. 3.114.1; Livy 22.46.4). Past that, it’s nearly not possible to provide a lot element to their gear. Plutarch describes the Carthaginian battle line in 341 as having leukaspides, ‘white aspides,’ implying their shields had been akin to the Greek aspis (spherical, dished) which inserts with a number of the very restricted representational proof we now have, however maybe with covers in disguise slightly than bronze (Plut. Tim. 27.4; 28.1). Later, Appian describes the Carthaginians through the Third Punic Conflict as having thureoi (= the Roman scutum), so they could have switched to the Gallic/Roman oval protect in some unspecified time in the future (App. Pun. 93). However on each instances these writers usually are not something like eyewitnesses and provides few particulars, so they might additionally each be incorrect.
Troopers from Libya additionally had a status as extremely succesful skirmish troops utilizing javelins and we see hints of this too. Hannibal has a gaggle of troopers whose origin is rarely clarified, Polybius refers to as lonchophoroi (λογχοφόροι), lonche-bearers. This time period has brought about no finish of issues, as a result of W.R. Paton interprets it as ‘pikemen’ (frustratingly un-fixed within the revised Paton, Walbank and Habicht (2010-2012) translation) main a variety of contemporary writers, particularly in style ones, to misconceive and picture these fellows as Hellenistic-style sarisa infantry. However the lonche (λόγχη) isn’t a sarisa; the Greeks use this phrase very broadly to explain non-Greek spears, however most frequently to point sorts of dual-purpose thrusting-and-throwing weapons utilized by lighter infantry and cavalry. Arrian makes use of the phrase of the spears wielded by the Tyrians – fellow Phoenicians! – combating Alexander at Tyre (Arr. Anab. 2.23.5) and Appian experiences the Carthaginians getting ready lonche for the Third Punic Conflict (App. Pun. 93).
So these aren’t pikes – Carthage by no means utilized a Hellenistic-style pike formation – however slightly a lighter dual-use spear. And let me simply repeat that as a result of I encounter this false impression on a regular basis, so for the oldsters within the again: Carthage by no means utilized a Hellenistic-style pike formation and certainly, Carthage’s personal custom of close-order heavy infantry may additionally not have been a direct imitation or growth from the Greek hoplite custom both (the Greeks had been hardly the one tradition to detect the thought of ‘close-order infantry with spears and spherical shields‘). And certainly, if one appears even a bit of carefully, the lonchophoroi are clearly a gentle infantry formation, usually deployed in a combined group with Hannibal’s different elite gentle infantry, his Balearian slingers. We additionally get a reference to “gentle armed Balearians and Africans” on the Battle of Baecula with a distinct Carthaginian military, suggesting this type of gentle infantry pairing could have been one thing of a normal (Livy 27.18.7).
So whereas most African infantry in Carthaginian service served as armored heavy infantry combating in close-order, a small subset served as elite gentle infantry utilizing lighter spears and infrequently deployed alongside slingers. On this sense, the lonchophoroi could have crammed a really comparable position to Rome’s personal velites: an built-in light-infantry javelin power which may scout or display the principle heavy infantry power. Hannibal’s mixed power of Balearians and lonchophoroi at Trebia was 8,000, in comparison with most likely one thing like 12,000 African ‘heavies,’ so there might need been one thing like 2 or 3 African ‘heavies’ for every gentle lonchophoros, which is sort of much like the Roman legion’s ratio of two.5 heavy squaddies (hastati, principes, triarii) to every veles.
As soon as recruited and outfitted, these fellows evidently stayed in service for a while, maybe all through the marketing campaign for which they had been raised. They had been most likely gathered in Carthage itself to be marshaled and outfitted. Notably, Polybius tells us that the households and possessions of the Carthaginian military getting back from Sicily had been initially ready in Carthage itself (Polyb. 1.66), so it looks as if these troops may depart their households in Carthage whereas out on marketing campaign.
It’s additionally clear these troopers had been paid, although we don’t know the pay charges. What we do know, once more from Polybius, is that like different mercenaries, most of their pay – their misthos (wages) as distinct from their sitos/sitonion/sitometria (upkeep pay) – appears to have been due at discharge, on the finish of a marketing campaign. That was, certainly, the issue that Carthage slammed into on the finish of the First Punic Conflict which led to the Mercenary Conflict: the battle being over, the arrears of their military instantly got here due at a second when Carthage itself was mainly bankrupt. That in flip may clarify the willingness of African communities to place up with this conscription regime: on the finish of every marketing campaign, their males would usually come again with an entire bunch of money of their pockets, primarily permitting every particular person group to ‘recapture’ a part of their tribute because it re-entered the group as settled misthos. That in flip, as Dexter Hoyos notes, may nicely have exacerbated the revolt towards Carthage after the First Punic Conflict: not solely had been the African troops incensed at not getting paid, however their residence communities additionally felt cheated out of this financial discount.
What is obvious is that African heavy infantry, supported most likely most often by gentle infantry lonchophoroi had been the spine of Carthaginian armies. Even when Carthaginian armies are composed primarily of Iberian or Gallic auxiliaries, allies or mercenaries, they’re constructed round an African ‘spine,’ offering generals a dependable and dependable military element because the core of their military.
In battle, the Africans are sometimes deployed in reserved positions. Hannibal tends (at each Trebia and Cannae) to place his Africans on the flanks, the place their heavier formation supplied robust construction to his military, but additionally the place they averted the brunt of the casualties. We’re informed that Hannibal’s losses at Trasimene had been concentrated amongst his Gallic troops (Polyb. 3.85.5) and at Cannae he evidently exposes his Gauls and Iberians and most of his losses (70%!) at that battle had been taken by his Gallic troops, with the remainder of the losses concentrated amongst his Iberians (Polyb. 3.117.6). On the Metaurus, Hasdrubal goals to win by attacking along with his Iberian troops, holding his Africans in reserve and along with his Gauls deployed merely to carry a hill on his left, suggesting each a scarcity of belief in his Gallic troops, but additionally a need to keep away from losses amongst his Africans (Livy 27.48, however see Lazenby (1978)). At Zama, Hannibal locations his Iberians, Gauls and Ligurians (alongside along with his skirmishers and elephants) within the entrance line, contemporary African and Carthaginian troops within the second line and his personal veterans within the last line (Polyb. 15.11; Livy 30.33). There’s a fairly clear sample right here during which Carthaginian generals intention to expend their Gauls first, their Iberians second and their Africans final.
Carthage’s African troops are additionally regularly decisive, come what may. They’re the heaviest infantry element in Carthage’s armies; our sources lead us to grasp that they’re as closely outfitted as every other sort of heavy infantry (hoplite, legionary, phalangite) within the Mediterranean on the time. Taking a look at our military figures from final time, we will additionally see that they’re current in important numbers in mainly each Carthaginian subject power through the Second Punic Conflict. Polybius likewise experiences that Africans made up the most important element of Carthage’s military on the finish of the First Punic Conflict, alongside Iberians, Gauls, Ligurians, Balearians and a few Greeks (1.66.7).
It’s arduous to exactly assess the fight efficiency of those African troops, as a result of they’re all the time deployed in combined models. Definitely, as famous earlier than, throughout Carthage’s Sicilian Wars, they appear to usually be defeated by Greek hoplites, however equally – as famous – Carthage in that narrative appears to nearly relentlessly ‘fail upward’ suggesting that maybe Carthaginian (and thus African) navy efficiency could have been considerably higher than our Greek sources let on. Through the First Punic Conflict, the Romans win almost the entire open subject engagements, however we by no means get a very detailed account of any of those battles, so it’s arduous to know what elements of the Carthaginian military broke first.
Through the Second Punic Conflict, nonetheless, we do get some detailed battle narratives and what we see is that Carthage’s African infantry seem to have the ability to maintain their very own towards Roman heavy infantry – fairly clearly the perfect accessible on the time – fairly nicely. When Carthaginian armies are defeated, the Africans are usually the final to interrupt; once they win, the Africans are sometimes the important thing components doing envelopment or holding key positions. On steadiness, then, I might say Carthage’s North African troops look like fairly succesful heavy infantry.
What Carthage doesn’t appear to have had was sufficient of them. We famous final time that at Carthage’s peak mobilization in 215, that they had about 50,000 African infantry below arms. Michael Taylor in Troopers & Silver (2020) appears extra broadly at reported Carthaginian armies and estimated populations and concludes (and I feel that is most likely proper) that this determine, round 50,000, most likely represented the utmost sustainable mobilization from the North African inhabitants accessible to Carthage. That’s not dangerous – it’s far greater than any Greek polis might handle – however hardly sufficient to rumble with alliances of Greek states (as in Sicily) or the key powers of the Mediterranean (like Pyrrhus or Rome within the Third Century) and so it must be supplemented.
And supplemented it was! And we’ll get to how within the subsequent installment after we take a look at what we’d time period Carthaginian ‘vassals.’
