Hey people, hearth this week! Subsequent week we’ll cap off our take a look at the Carthaginian military by masking a number of the ‘odds and ends’ elements (slingers, elephants), earlier than how that combination of troop-types was employed in battle throughout the third century.
For this week’s musing, I figured I might reply a query that all the time come up in discussions of the Second Punic Warfare: why didn’t Hannibal simply take Rome? First it’s price noting that is hardly only a trendy false impression – the concept that Hannibal should have simply stormed Rome itself after Cannae exhibits up even within the historic sources. However the reply to ‘why didn’t Hannibal simply take Rome’ is that he couldn’t.
I need to tackle two totally different variations of that query, one which asks why he didn’t take Rome and one which asks if Hannibal ought to or may have taken Rome if he had siege gear, reflecting an assumption that it was simply Hannibal’s lack of siege gear that prevented him from swiftly taking town.
Let’s tackle the siege gear facet of the equation first: I feel this assumes siege and protection expertise extra akin to warfare within the age of gunpowder the place siege artillery each wanted to be produced upfront (you may’t throw collectively cannon in a rush) after which moved to the siege website and likewise the place trying to breach a fortress with out cannon merely wasn’t going to work.
In contrast, the fundamental parts of siege warfare in antiquity should not catapults, however earthwork ramps, picket towers and battering rams, all of which may be constructed on website out of native timber assets. Catapults – which in antiquity means torsion-powered catapults, not counter-weight or traction trebuchets – required extra engineering experience and preparation, however have been typically a ‘good to have’ aspect of a siege, not a ‘should have.’ Catapults aren’t often anticipated to breach partitions, however relatively to degrade them by smashing aside the crenelation (the zig-zag sample that creates a protected preventing place on the highest of the wall) or collapse towers.
That mentioned, after Cannae, Hannibal has entry to Capua and Tarentum – each of which revolted from the Romans within the aftermath of the battle. Between the 2 (and his quickly alliance with Philip V), if Hannibal wanted engineers who may construct him torsion catapults, he can completely get them. His military is actually additionally able to constructing ladders, rams and towers, although once more this might be carried out on website. Briefly, if Hannibal wished to get siege gear, he completely may.
Siege gear isn’t the issue: logistics and geography are.
Rome is positioned alongside the Tiber on the assembly level of two areas: Latium (the place the Latins reside) to the south and Etruria (trendy Tuscany, the place the Etruscans reside) to the north. Rome itself, in 216 is a walled metropolis that hasn’t but spilled nicely exterior of its partitions (as it’s going to do within the two centuries following). It’s additionally not undefended: Roman recruitment focuses on comparatively younger males (from 17 to the late 20s), that means that even after the catastrophe of Cannae, Rome doesn’t lack 30- and 40-year previous veterans capable of take up arms to defend town. Recall that the Roman dilectus usually solely recruits iuniores (ages 17-46), however may recruit seniores (47+) in an emergency or to garrison town itself towards assault. So if Hannibal marches on Rome, he’ll discover a walled metropolis with a big garrison.
Which means an extended siege, even when he has siege gear. Bear in mind, catapults aren’t going to supply a breach shortly: their objective is to degrade fortifications to allow escalade (attacking over the wall) utilizing towers, ladders or – most reliably and ceaselessly – an earthwork ramp (known as a mole). If he assaults Rome (or another giant, fortified city) Hannibal goes to be caught in place for fairly some time.
And that’s a deadly downside, for causes that should do with that geography. Even after Cannae, not one of the cities of Etruria or Latium have revolted from Rome. What which means is that the territory round Rome is studded over with Latin and Etruscan cities – functionally all of them walled. To march from the closest main pleasant settlement (Capua), Hannibal must bypass a few dozen fortified Latin cities, leaving them intact and hostile in his rear.
Which in flip has two apparent operational issues. The primary is that the Romans can proceed elevating navy pressure, so whereas Hannibal settles right down to spend months besieging Rome, the Romans could possibly be pulling collectively one other huge military from their Italian socii, which might be forming up behind Hannibal. That in flip places his smaller military in a very dangerous place and does so whereas he’s successfully rooted to 1 spot and thus unable to maneuver. And that issues as a result of Hannibal’s run of success up thus far has been in a big half predicated on his means to maneuver and thus have the Romans have interaction him on floor of his selecting. By besieging Rome, he’d be permitting the Romans to dictate the place and when their reduction military challenged his siege and compelled a pitched battle.
However there’s one other much more rapid downside: logistics. As a result of the cities of Latium are fortified, Hannibal can not entry their grain shops with out seizing them, which he can not do with out besieging them. The wanting lightning campaigns of conquest that generals like Alexander III carry out relied in no small half on cities like this ‘surrendering upfront,’ however the Latins and Etruscans had already refused to do that (and certainly, had additionally not carried out it when Pyrrhus truly did a lightning intimidation march on Rome again in 280; he couldn’t cease to besiege town both).
Worse but, with these cities garrisoned and untaken in his rear, Hannibal’s means to forage provides could be fatally hampered. If he tried to dispatch foraging events – dispersing his already numerically inferior pressure – he could be susceptible both to having his small foraging events picked off by forces sortieing out of these Latin or Etruscan cities or, if he vastly enlarged his foraging occasion, to having his besieging pressure overwhelmed if the big Roman garrison sallied out.
Briefly, the presence of fortified Latin and Etruscan cities throughout Rome, dominating the countryside and thus the agricultural provide base Hannibal wanted for operations within the area, fatally difficult any effort to besiege Rome immediately. In an effort to transfer towards Rome immediately, Hannibal would have wanted to painstakingly besiege every Latin city in flip till he may open a transparent provide route from Capua by to Rome.
In follow, what truly occurs is that Hannibal first focuses on making an attempt to safe his new ‘base’ in southern Italy and finally ends up mainly enjoying whack-a-mole: Hannibal’s military may solely be in a single place, however the Romans may deploy a number of armies. Often, one in every of these armies shadowed Hannibal to restrict his foraging, include his actions and frustrate his efforts to besiege settlements that remained loyal to Rome, whereas one other military superior the duty of systematically decreasing the communities that had revolted, besieging them one after the other. Hannibal is ready to win some victories in that wrestle, however by no means to truly take the initiative and so he finally ends up slowly however steadily shedding floor.
Certainly one of as of late, I suppose, we should do a full run-through of the Second Punic Warfare, as a result of there may be much more conflict occurring then most informal college students of historic historical past typically understand. The Romans and Carthaginians (and their allies) are in any given 12 months actively engaged in main operations in southern Italy (often with multiple Roman military) and Spain, with supporting operations in Illyria (towards Philip), Sicily (towards Syracuse) and northern Italy (towards the Cisalpine Gauls), all supported by naval operations (each side have lively fleets, though the Carthaginians make a transparent selection to not immediately problem the Roman navy). So there’s a lot occurring in most years that merely don’t get lined in remedies of the conflict until they go actually in-depth.
Thankfully, if you happen to do need to untangle the primary two Punic Wars, this week’s guide suggestions will allow you to accomplish that.
On to Suggestions.
I need to lead with L’Expérience Hoplitique, titled in English The Hoplite Experiment: in regards to the routes in historic Greece, an interesting effort to simulate hoplite battle with reenactors at scale (200 to every facet). Now I feel it’s price noting up entrance that this kind of experimental method is nearly unavoidably wholly captive to its assumptions: these fellows aren’t in precise mortal peril (and even carrying armor) and so they aren’t responding organically to a risk surroundings: as a substitute they’re enjoying a job laid out by the organizers, so the outcomes of the experiment will likely be to a really giant diploma managed by the assumptions of these planners. Nonetheless, there’s a variety of worth right here, due to the methods such an experiment can reveal or display the emergent properties of these assumptions. Specifically, the dynamics of the advance and the rout right here – primarily experiments in crowd dynamics – are fairly revealing. That mentioned, I feel the usage of a more-or-less shoving othismos right here (it seems solely briefly as a result of they have been making an attempt to check the rout) is a product of reenactors utilizing blunts and I stay deeply not sure that actual people would actually keep that shut for that lengthy underneath that a lot risk.
We additionally received a brand new Pasts Imperfect this week, which options an attention-grabbing essay by Matthew Vernon connecting the movie Sinners (2025) with the medieval Outdated English epic Beowulf. I discover I actually like Vernon’s restrained however attention-grabbing argument right here – not that Sinners adapts and even was impressed by Beowulf, however that the 2 tales are riffing off of the identical themes of sin and the unknown, ‘how novel social preparations emerge in instances of terror’ and naturally expressing that terror (in the true world the product of actual people) as monstrous exterior forces. People being people, we are inclined to return to related tales to precise related anxieties, a reminder that we’re related by our humanity even when separated by gulfs of centuries.
Additionally price noting in the identical difficulty of Pasts Imperfect is the vital story that the ACLS, the American Historic Affiliation and the Trendy Language Affiliation have been capable of win a courtroom case over the mass cancellation of grants on the NEH (the ‘DOGE’ing’ of the NEH, because it have been). We’ve talked earlier than about how small a portion of the federal price range the NEH represents, how meager humanities funding is and but these cuts left fairly deep wounds in fields which can be already struggling. Equally, PI contains one of many many movies to return out of the depositions for this case that are, collectively, remarkably revealing in simply how vapid the DOGE’ing was, an train of uncooked energy by people – most of them fairly younger and inexperienced – who didn’t perceive a lot of something in regards to the applications and tasks they have been killing.
Lastly, on a contemporary navy subject, I need to spotlight over at Secretary of Protection Rock (SODRock)’s Historical past Does You, an essay, “Sq. Peg in a Spherical Gap: AirPower towards Cell Targets and Missiles: A Case Examine of Operation Crossbow, Scud Looking and Iran.” SODRock right here makes the purpose that the failure to disable Iran’s missile arsenal – upwards of three-quarters of which stays intact, reportedly – truly suits right into a broader sample the place cellular launch techniques are merely extraordinarily laborious to focus on successfully from the air. Readers will, after all, know that I feel that the sharp limits of airpower is a lesson that each navy and civilian management must tackle board and have additionally largely failed to take action. Airpower stays seductive as a result of it feels simple and protected, however additionally it is typically ineffective. It isn’t a straightforward answer to make use of instead of the laborious options of diplomacy or boots-on-the-ground.
On to this week’s guide advice and right here I’ve one thing of a two-fer for you all. I’m going to advocate what I feel are the most effective two marketing campaign histories of the Punic Wars, J.F. Lazenby, The First Punic Warfare: A Army Historical past (1996) and J.F. Lazenby, Hannibal’s Warfare: A Army Historical past (1998). Each have been in-print for mainly endlessly, so the volumes are reasonably priced and it isn’t laborious to search out used copies floating round.
Now I really feel like I should be clear what these books are and what they aren’t. These actually are marketing campaign histories: the main focus is on the motion of armies, the place, nature and consequence of battles and the general strategic place. There may be some broader thematic evaluation – Lazenby is prepared to critique Carthaginian technique (unfairly, I’ve argued) and reward Roman technique (pretty) and acknowledge the higher effectiveness of the Roman navy system (additionally truthful) – however this isn’t a ‘war-and-society’ method, neither is Lazenby aiming to present the reader an outline of the entire of the Roman or Carthaginian navy system. As a substitute, each volumes are a ‘after which what occurred…’ narrative of their respective wars. Typically, I feel one may pretty critique these books as being, as we’d say, considerably ‘under-theorized’ in that regard.
That will sound relatively extra damaging than I intend, however I don’t imply it as such – I’m merely stating what Lazenby has not tried in these two books.
What Lazenby has tried in these two books is to supply that clear, direct marketing campaign historical past. That seems to matter rather a lot as a result of these are large, lengthy wars with many shifting elements. The First Punic Warfare (264-241) lasts 23 years and is fought at sea and on land (on each Sicily and North Africa, with temporary raids into Italy and Corsica and Sardinia), whereas the Second Punic Warfare (218-201) runs a ‘mere’ 17 years and has fronts – typically simultaneous fronts – in northern Italy, southern Italy, Spain, Sicily, North Africa, Corsica and Sardinia, Illyria and Greece. The sources for these wars are additionally complicated: Polybius is nice when you will get him, however he ‘cuts out’ (misplaced textual content) for a lot of the Second Punic Warfare and even for the First Punic Warfare the place his full remedy survives, his narrative may be usefully supplemented by different sources (typically very obscure different sources).
Lazenby takes all of that – the assorted fragmented, typically conflicting, scattered sources and the complexities of monitoring operations in a bunch of various theaters – and kinds it right into a single narrative that lets the reader observe the event of every conflict on a year-to-year foundation. The ample notes additionally let the reader themselves shortly discover the passages he’s to see why Lazenby makes the assessments he does. On this sense, I feel the 2 Lazenby volumes present the most effective basis to then start pushing into a number of the extra ‘thematic’ remedies of parts of the conflict, which regularly presuppose a fundamental information of what occurred, the place and when. I’ll be aware that Lazenby’s prose is greater than a little bit dry, however that may be its personal advantage: he’s typically fairly clear, useful when making an attempt to maintain observe of a posh battle with many shifting elements.
