That is the primary a part of a sequence trying on the construction of the Carthaginian military. Though Carthage has an (unfair!) status for being a rustic of “peaceable retailers who tended to keep away from wars,” Carthage was, I’ll argue, with out query the second best army energy the Mediterranean produced – eclipsed solely by Rome. If we don’t notice this, it’s merely as a result of Carthage had the misfortune to battle Rome ‘within the first spherical,’ because it had been.
Carthage is, specifically, the one army energy that ever manages to noticeably problem Rome on an excellent footing, blow for blow, after the Romans accomplished the conquest of Italy. The Carthaginian army system pushes Rome to the very brink of defeat twice, in distinction to the Hellenistic nice powers, the heirs of Alexander, none of which ever pressure the Romans to ‘dig deep’ into their forces. Put one other method: the Romans put Alexander’s heirs to mattress mobilizing towards them lower than a 3rd of the army pressure it took for Rome to match Carthage. The Carthaginians inflicted extra casualties on the Romans in a single day than the entire successor states (a label which doesn’t embrace Epirus, so no Pyrrhus right here; price noting the Carthaginians beat him too) managed in pitched battle mixed. They usually did this greater than as soon as; I’d hazard they managed it about seven occasions.
So on this sequence, we’re going to lay out the construction of Carthage’s armies (alas, now we have little or no data as to the construction of their navy), as a result of as we’ll see, the Carthaginian army system was fairly advanced, drawing troopers from all around the western Mediterranean.
Now there’s an a little bit of organizational trickiness right here: Carthage drew forces from many alternative locations at many alternative occasions. In observe, the Carthaginian army turns into seen to us as early as 480 (with the Battle of Himera) and appears to vary considerably between this era and the military seen to us within the first e-book of Polybius, which fights the First Punic Struggle (254-241) and the Mercenary Struggle (241-237). Then the Carthaginian military undergoes one other substantial shift seen to us, when it comes to its composition, through the Barcid Conquest of Spain (237-218) such that the Carthaginian military that fights within the Second Punic Struggle (218-201) seems to be very totally different once more. And then Carthage loses its military and so its army forces from 201 to the tip of the Carthaginian state in 146 look totally different once more.
My answer right here is to construction this remedy across the largest Carthaginian mobilizations, which had been these through the Second Punic Struggle: Carthaginian numbers peaked in 215 with one thing on the order of 165,000 males underneath arms. We’ll work by way of the elements of that pressure (working, because it did, in a number of theaters) and for every part of it, we are able to then observe how – as greatest we are able to inform – that particular part modified over time.
I must also observe what I’m not doing right here: this isn’t a full rundown of Carthage’s army historical past or the Punic Wars; moderately it’s an overview of the elements of Carthage’s land forces. I feel a remedy of the Punic Wars on the same degree to our “Phalanx’s Twilight, Legion’s Triumph” sequence might be price doing, however can be a a lot bigger and extra concerned sequence than this, as a result of the Punic Wars are fairly lengthy conflicts with many twists and turns and sometimes a number of simultaneous theaters. In the future!
However first, as all the time, elevating massive armies of mercenaries, topic conscripts, vassal warlords and allies is pricey! Should you too need to assist me invade Italy with a multi-ethnic military of various origins in a doomed effort to cease the Roman Republic, you possibly can assist by supporting this venture over at Patreon. In order for you updates at any time when a brand new submit seems or need to hear my extra bite-sized musings on historical past, safety affairs and present occasions, you possibly can comply with me on Bluesky (@bretdevereaux.bsky.social). I’m additionally lively on Threads (bretdevereaux) and preserve a de minimis presence on Twitter (@bretdevereaux).
(Bibliography Notice: Any bibliography for the lay reader trying to become familiar with Carthage possible has to start with D. Hoyos, The Carthaginians (2010) which offers a strong basis on understanding the Carthaginian state and society. A strong overview of Carthaginian army historical past is offered by J.R. Corridor, Carthage at Struggle: Punic Armies c. 814-146 (2023). For particular intervals in Carthaginian army historical past, observe J.F. Lazenby, The First Punic Struggle: A Army Historical past (1996), then D. Hoyos, Truceless Struggle (2007) on the Mercenary Struggle and D. Hoyos, Hannibal’s Dynasty (2003) on the Carthaginian conquest of Spain, earlier than going again to J.F. Lazenby for Hannibal’s Struggle (1978) on the Second Punic Struggle. G. Daly, Cannae: The expertise of battle within the Second Punic Struggle (2002) has, amongst different issues, one of many higher run-downs of the composition of Hannibal’s military. On the Gauls in Carthaginian armies, observe L. Baray, Les Celtes d’Hannibal (2019), alas not translated. On the Numidians, a key part of Carthage’s military, see W. Horsted, The Numidians, 300 BC – AD 300 (2021), whereas on the Spanish warriors who fought for Carthage, see Quesada Sanz, F. Armas de la Antigua Iberia: De Tartesos a Numancia (2010) now obtainable in translation as F. Quesada Sanz, Weapons, Warriors & Battles of Historical Iberia (2023), trans. E. Clowes and P.S. Harding-Vera. You may also discover what little we find out about Balaerian slingers within the opening chapters of L. Keppie, Slingers and Sling Bullets within the Roman Civil Wars of the Late Republic, 90-31 BC (2023). Lastly, one should observe N. Pilkington, The Carthaginian Empire (2019), an usually heterodox however equally generally persuasive reassessment of what we all know of Carthage that’s intensely skeptical of our literary supply custom and an important learn (for settlement and disagreement) if one is desiring to get knee-deep within the scholarship.)
A Temporary Chronology
First, earlier than we get into the main points, we must always lay out the essential chronology of Carthaginian army historical past, as a result of as we’re going to see, not solely does Carthage draw upon a bunch of various sources of army manpower, these sources themselves change over time of their composition and position throughout the Carthaginian system.
Now we must always begin with some background right here on the character of Carthage and its management over its core territory in North Africa. Carthage was a Phoenician colony, based in North Africa (in modern-day Tunisia). The inhabitants was thus possible a mixture of native Libyan peoples, Phoenician settlers and even different maritime peoples (Aegeans, e.g. Greeks). The Carthaginians themselves maintained a transparent ideology of being Phoenicians, utilizing a Punic language, worshiping Punic gods and making a transparent connection to their mother-city of Tyre, nevertheless some trendy DNA analysis has steered the precise inhabitants of Phoenician colonies might need been extra genetically various than now we have typically supposed. After all, not each resident of Carthage was prone to be a citizen and positively the impression we get is that some Phoenician ancestry was a requirement for full citizenship.
Carthage was hardly the one such colony in North Africa (Utica, Thapsus (in North Africa), Leptis, Leptiminus, and so on. had been all such colonies), however there was additionally a considerable native Libyan inhabitants and at the very least initially Carthage was subordinate to these peoples; we’re instructed that fairly Carthage’s first few centuries after its founding (mid-eighth century) paid tribute to the locals, a relationship that inverted fairly dramatically as Carthage turned stronger. Carthage appears to start projecting energy abroad significantly within the mid-to-late-500s, although we can’t all the time see this early course of in addition to we’d like. By c. 500, Carthage appears to manage Sardinia and the western coast of Sicily. Some signal of Carthage’s increasing management in North Africa comes when they’re able to block Dorieus (a Spartan prince) from making a Greek colony in North Africa after which shortly thereafter additionally destroy his effort to discovered a colony in western Sicily, between 515 and 510 or so. Sadly, we’re probably not effectively knowledgeable in any respect concerning the armies they used to do that
As a substitute, Carthaginian armies first begin to develop into actually seen to us within the context of the operating contest between Carthage and Syracuse for management over the remainder of Sicily, which kicks off within the 480s. From the 480s to the 270s, Carthage fights a sequence of wars with the Greeks on Sicily, the latter typically organized across the largest and strongest Greek metropolis there, Syracuse. There’s a tendency for college students to be stunned that Carthage – given its obvious energy within the third century – is unable to beat (or be overcome by) Syracuse, however it’s price remembering that Syracuse is a actually massive polis, on the identical scale as Athens or Sparta. Recall that from 415 to 413, the Athenians throw the lion’s share of their army, on the peak of their energy at Syracuse and lose successfully all of it for his or her hassle, so Syracuse – at the very least when effectively led and arranged – is a reasonably main energy (in as a lot as any energy aside from the Achaemenids may be main) on this interval.
In any case, the primary Carthaginian-Greek conflict in Sicily begins within the 480s and ends with the Battle of Himera in 480. They’re then again at it from 409 to 405, then once more from 398 to 396, then once more from 383 to 381 (?), then once more from 368 to 367, then once more 345 to 341 and once more from 311 to 306 after which lastly from 278 to 276, Pyrrhus of Epirus reveals as much as marketing campaign towards Carthage on behalf of the Greeks. On the one hand, at any given time in these wars, territorial management usually swings wildly between Carthage and Syracuse, however then again zooming out, over the long-term comparatively little adjustments and the entire thing resembles a stalemate: Carthage controls the west of the island, Syracuse the east and the settlements within the center both handle within the fracture-zone between the powers or submit to at least one or the opposite.
Alongside the early phases of this operating warfare on Sicily, Carthage is steadily subduing the world round it in North Africa, decreasing the Libyan and Phoenician settlements in what’s as we speak Tunisia to semi-autonomous topics. These communities remained internally self-governing, however had been in observe dominated by Carthage and we’ll speak about that relationship within the subsequent submit within the sequence. We are able to’t totally see this course of clearly however by c. 400, Carthage clearly appears to have management over most of its instant environment. Carthage additionally started interacting fairly early with the Numidians, the Berber peoples to the west (typically divided into two kingdoms, Massaesylii and Massylii) generally recruiting them and generally combating them. Definitely by the beginning of the third century if not earlier, Carthage is the dominant energy on this relationship.
The Carthaginians are additionally clearly lively in commerce in Spain, although it’s unclear to what diploma the Phoenician settlements there fall underneath Carthaginian political management and when.
Thus even by c. 480, Carthage is among the main imperial powers within the western Mediterranean, although hardly the one ‘main participant’ and stays so, steadily rising in dimension and affect over the following a number of centuries. By c. 300, the Carthaginians have secured management over western Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia, have some small footholds in Spain and most significantly have secured management over most of what’s as we speak Tunisia (what the Romans would simply name ‘Africa’) and have a dominant if steadily shifting place relative to the Numidians.
That set the stage for the main wars of the third century. Carthage was in a robust place in Sicily after the tip of their conflict with Agathocles (in 306), resulting in the Sicilians to attraction to Pyrrhus within the 270s. Pyrrhus, arriving in 278 was in a position to win important victories and pin the Carthaginians again to their final main coastal base in Lilybaeum, however was unable to take it (being unable to interrupt Carthaginian naval management) and subsequently pressured out in 276 as soon as his assist among the many Sicilian Greeks ebbed, struggling a nasty naval defeat on his method out for his hassle.
That left Carthage in a dominant place in Sicily (however nonetheless dealing with a potent foe in Syracuse) when in 264 a gaggle of mercenaries (the Mamertines) leftover from Agathocles’ conflict who had seized Messina – underneath strain from Syracuse – appealed to each Rome and Carthage for assist. That led to a 4(-ish) method conflict wherein two of the edges (the Mamertines and Syracuse) quickly discovered themselves rendered irrelevant. The end result was the First Punic Struggle (264-241) between Rome and Carthage, basically a conflict for management over Sicily, though the Romans did invade North Africa (unsuccessfully) in 256.
Carthage loses the conflict, with Rome consolidating management over Sicily, solely to be instantly beset by a brand new conflict, the Mercenary Struggle (241-237), when a mutiny by Carthage’s unpaid mercenaries from the tip of the First Punic Struggle set off a normal revolt of its topics in North Africa. The Carthaginians win this conflict, significantly with the management of Hamilcar Barca, who’s then too politically influential to be left in Carthage, so he’s packed off with a military to go do stuff in Spain. The ‘stuff’ he does in Spain from 237 to his loss of life in 228 is to subdue almost the complete Mediterranean coast as much as the Ebro River, with that process then accomplished by first his son-in-law, Hasdrubal the Truthful after which Hamilcar’s eldest son Hannibal.
That units the stage for ’spherical two’ with Rome, the Second Punic Struggle (218-201), a fully large conflict waged throughout Italy, Spain and Africa, which represents the height army output of both Rome or Carthage (though the First Punic Struggle, with its large fleets, in all probability roughly matches it). Completely defeated in 201, Carthage is shorn of its abroad empire and far of its extra distant African holdings, primarily decreased to ‘merely’ controlling northern Tunisia. Nevertheless, speedy Carthaginian financial restoration leads Rome to instigate a 3rd conflict with Carthage, the Third Punic Struggle (149-146). In contrast to the earlier two wars, this isn’t an excellent contest: Carthage by this level is far smaller and weaker an influence than Rome. Decided Carthaginian resistance prolongs the conflict, however Rome is finally in a position to seize the town and destroy the Carthaginian state in 146.
Now, one factor price noting on the finish of this transient, potted historical past is for almost all of this era, now we have solely Greek sources (Romans, writing in Latin, solely actually are available in with the Punic Wars and even then our earliest Roman sources – Fabius Pictor – are misplaced, so we get him processed by way of a Greek – Polybius). One of many options of the historical past we do have of Carthage that I believe outcomes from that is that Carthage appears to lose lots. However it’s, at the very least till 264, a wierd form of shedding: Carthage reveals up in our sources shedding main battles however then one strikes ahead a number of many years and Carthage’s empire is bigger and extra affluent. After which Carthage loses one other main battle and but someway, a number of many years later Carthage is much more highly effective.
So both Carthage is the world champion at failing upwards or there’s something happening with our sources. And it isn’t laborious to essentially guess what: our key supply for Carthaginian historical past earlier than 264 is Diodorus Siculus, that’s, ‘Diodorus the Sicilian,’ a Sicilian Greek writing within the first century B.C. who thus very clearly has a aspect in Carthage’s lengthy wars with the Sicilian Greeks. Even when Diodorus is doing his greatest to present us a straight story, which battles are his sources prone to keep in mind or commemorate most prominently: the Time They Actually Walloped the Carthaginians or maybe smaller engagements that they misplaced? Thus whereas we can’t know for sure, I discover that I believe Carthage’s battle-record pre-264 is probably going moderately higher than our sources recommend.
Put up-264, it appears price noting that whereas Carthage loses extra usually than they win towards the Romans, they nonetheless handle to ship Rome some fairly beautiful defeats. The notion that Carthaginians are ‘peaceable retailers’ or simply ‘unmilitary’ thus appears to be nearly totally empty, an almost pure product of later stereotypes about ‘unmanly easterners’ moderately than a conclusion justified by the proof. On the very least, by the point Rome was able to battle Carthage, the Carthaginians very a lot knew how you can throw a punch – certainly, they might punch Rome far more durable than another foe.
That also offers some 300 years the place Carthage is a significant army energy the place we are able to see their army actions, in order you may think, the form of the Carthaginian military adjustments lots over that interval.
Element Elements
The subsequent factor we should do, to get an total sense of the system, then, is to put out the size of Carthaginian forces on the peak of the Second Punic Struggle, representing the most important land mobilization that Carthage ever produced. The scale of the mobilization is staggering, as is the range of the way it was raised: like most imperial powers, Carthage’s military was a various medley of troopers drawn from principally in all places that Carthaginian energy reached. The best way these troopers had been included into Carthage’s armies was in flip a product of what their relationship to the Carthaginian state was – residents, topics, vassals, allies, mercenary staff.
Our sources, most significantly Polybius, present us sufficient element to get a fairly first rate accounting of Carthage’s ‘peak’ mobilization, which is available in 215. Hannibal, in fact, had a Carthaginian area military at the moment in Italy – he had gained the Battle of Cannae (216) the yr earlier than – however there have been additionally Carthaginian armies in Spain, Sardinia and Africa, together with an lively fleet. Carthage alone of the Mediterranean powers of the period appears to have been in a position to match Rome’s capability for multi-theater warfare: whereas Hellenistic kingdoms may actually solely have one major theater of conflict at a time, each Rome and Carthage may wage a number of parallel campaigns concurrently and did so.
So let’s break down the proof for what now we have.
We are able to start with Hannibal’s military in Italy, which Polybius tells us (3.114.5) consisted of 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry for the Battle of Cannae (216). We are able to truly work backwards with just a bit little bit of guessing to interrupt down this military into its unit composition: Hannibal crosses the Alps with 12,000 Africans, 8,000 Iberians, and 6,000 cavalry, taking some losses within the subsequent battles but additionally absorbing round 9,000 Gallic infantry and 5,000 Gallic cavalry. Figuring for attrition, the composition of Hannibal’s military at Cannae has to have a look at least one thing like round 10,000 African infantry, 6,000 Iberian infantry, round 8,000 blended ‘lights’ (North African lonchophoroi, which implies ‘javelin-men’ not ‘pikemen’ as it’s generally mistranslated) and Balearian slingers and 16,000 Gallic infantry to make the whole. Of the cavalry we would suspect round 5,000 of it was Gallic cavalry and the remainder cut up roughly evenly between Numidian cavalry from Africa and Iberian cavalry (each of which we’re instructed Hannibal has).
We then want to switch that pressure for Hannibal’s losses at Cannae: he misplaced 4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Iberians and 200 cavalry, however was bolstered late within the yr (Polyb. 3.117.6; Livy 23.13.7) with 4,000 extra Numidian cavalry and 40 elephants. That leaves Hannibal in 215 with a military of roughly 50,000: 10,000 African infantry, 12,000 Gallic infantry, 4,500 Iberian infantry, 8,000 blended ‘lights’ (lonchophoroi and Balearian slingers), round 5,000 Gallic cavalry and maybe 10,000 different cavalry, of which we would guess that possibly 2/3rds had been Numidian and 1/third Iberian.
On the similar time in Italy there’s a second Carthaginian military working in Bruttium (trendy Calabria; Hannibal is working out of recent Apulia) underneath the command of Hanno with 17,000 infantry composed largely of Roman socii which have defected to Hannibal, together with 1,200 cavalry, largely Spanish and Numidian (Livy 24.15.2).
The factor is Hannibal doesn’t have Carthage’s largest military. One of many errors college students make in assessing the Second Punic Struggle is focusing – as most trendy remedies do – nearly totally on Hannibal. However for Carthage, getting reinforcements to Hannibal could be very laborious – Rome at this level has a robust navy to allow them to’t simply sail to Italy – however the conflict can be very lively in Spain. Carthage had come to manage the Mediterranean coast of Spain because of the conquests of Hamilcar Barca (we’ll talk about this extra after we get to those guys in a few weeks) and Rome was looking for to tear that a part of the empire away.
Carthage had three generals working in Spain by 215 – Hasdrubal and Mago Barca (Hannibal’s brothers) and Hasdrubal Gisco. Livy studies the mixed energy of all three at 60,000 (Livy 23.49) and as soon as once more with some cautious monitoring by way of Livy and Polybius we are able to principally break this pressure right down to roughly 24,000 African infantry (a mixture of Hannibal’s troops left behind and reinforcements introduced by Mago), a contact lower than 2,000 African cavalry, and the rest – about 34,000 – largely Iberian troops together with some small items of Gauls (300 from Liguria) and Balearian slingers (500). We may be pretty ‘tough’ with these numbers as a result of we’re coping with ‘paper strengths’ which are going to be off to some extent in any case – the purpose here’s a tough approximation of an estimate, as a result of our sources aren’t going to get higher than that.
As well as, there was a Carthaginian military dispatched to Sardinia to attempt to retake it, a pressure Livy studies as being roughly the identical dimension because the reinforcements Mago delivered to Spain, which might imply 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, in all probability almost all African (Livy 23.23.12).
Lastly, Carthage maintained a pressure nonetheless in Africa. Hannibal had, on the conflict’s outset, transferred to Africa some 13,850 Iberian infantry, 870 Balearian slingers and 1,200 Iberian cavalry, whereas redeploying some 4,000 Metagonians (from what’s as we speak jap Morocco) to Carthage as effectively.
Taking all of that collectively we are able to estimate very roughly (with some rounding) that Carthage has, underneath arms, in 215:
- 50,000 African infantry
- 17,000 Italian socii
- 12,000 Gallic infantry
- 52,000 Iberian infantry
- 10,000 numerous ‘lights’ (together with at the very least 1,370 Balearian slingers)
- 21,000 cavalry of which in all probability roughly
- 5,000 are Gallic cavalry
- 5,000 are Iberian cavalry
- 11,000 are African and Numidian cavalry (with the Numidians in all probability the bigger share)
For a complete of roughly 162,000 males underneath arms. Notably lacking from this whole are any Carthaginian citizen troops, however for causes I’ll get to under, I do suppose there in all probability had been some in North Africa. For comparability, the peak mobilizations of the main successor states (the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms) are in all probability round 80,000 males. Carthage is doubling that mobilization and really almost matching Rome’s personal most mobilization (round 185,000 males).
Carthaginian Citizen Troopers
Now you’ll have observed one thing a bit of odd for the Carthaginian military implied by the figures above: there aren’t any Carthaginians in it. And that tends to be one of many core issues that people ‘know’ about Carthaginian armies, which is that these had been ‘mercenary’ armies, the place Carthaginians solely served as officers. That’s, in spite of everything, roughly instantly what Polybius tells us and historians historical and trendy are inclined to take Polybius at his phrase. And whereas Polybius is being greater than a bit of sneaky together with his description of Carthaginian armies as mercenary in nature, the concept that Carthaginians didn’t serve in amount in Carthaginian armies is at the very least half true, however with necessary geographical and chronological limitations.
Right here, we have an interest within the Carthaginian residents themselves. And we start with the primary exception to the concept that Carthaginian residents didn’t battle, the chronological one: Carthaginian citizen armies are literally quite common in all places (that’s, each at house and overseas) within the fifth and fourth century. Diodorus (11.22.2) studies ‘Phoenicians’ within the Carthaginian military for the Battle of Himera (480) that are possible Carthaginian citizen troopers we hear of Carthaginian citizen troopers in later Carthaginian expeditions to Sicily in 409 too. As late as 339, on the Battle of the Crimissus, the Carthaginian military consists of, in keeping with Diodorus, a Sacred Band of Carthaginian residents a number of thousand robust (Diod. Sic. 16.80.4) which appears to be a picked pressure from a bigger physique of Carthaginian residents, on condition that he describes its members as distinguished even among the many residents for valor, status and wealth.
Now in most remedies the following factor that can get mentioned is that within the third century – when each the First (264-241) and Second (218-201) Punic Wars happen – the Carthaginians modified this coverage and residents stopped serving besides as officers. However I feel that maybe misses what is de facto occurring right here and the rationale has to do with the angle of our sources: now we have no Carthaginian sources and even North African sources. What now we have are the studies primarily of Romans (who fought Carthage), Greeks on Sicily (who fought Carthage) and mainland Greeks like Polybius, who relied on the opposite two. My level isn’t essentially that these sources are hostile to Carthage (although they’re), however moderately that their focus is directed. We’re seeing Carthage like one would see a statute in a darkish room lit totally from one aspect: solely half the statute shall be illuminated.
Our sources are very within the armies that Carthage sends towards Syracuse and Rome and nearly totally uninterested – or uninformed! – concerning the forces that Carthage would possibly muster elsewhere. We solely see Carthaginian North Africa clearly briefly snippets: when a Greek or Roman tries to invade it (310, 256, 204and 149) or within the context of a serious revolt just like the Mercenary Struggle (241-237) which attracts our sources consideration.
However what can we see at any time when the motion shifts to North Africa? Citizen troopers in Carthage’s armies. Whereas Diodorus inserts into his narrative a line about how the Carthaginians had been unprepared for combating when Agathocles (tyrant of Syracuse) lands his military in Africa in 310, they rapidly handle to place collectively a citizen soldier military – Diodorus says of some 40,000 troopers, however Diodorus’ numbers right here are sometimes ineffective (Diod. Sic. 20.10.5-6). We don’t hear something about citizen troopers throughout Rome’s unsuccessful invasion in 256 (through the First Punic Struggle), however when Carthage’s expeditionary military (returned from Sicily on the conflict’s finish) revolts in 241, Carthage instantly raises a citizen military to place down the revolt and succeeds in doing so (Polyb. 1.73.1-2). Likewise, when P. Cornelius Scipio soon-to-be-Africanus lands in North Africa in 204, the Carthaginians elevate citizen forces (alongside all of their different troops) to attempt to cease him and Carthaginian residents shaped a serious a part of Hannibal’s military at Zama (202; Polyb. 15.11.2-4), together with each infantry and cavalry.
And naturally, when Rome returned for the ultimate act within the Third Punic Struggle (149-146), Carthage – largely shorn of its empire – responded by mobilizing a citizen pressure to defend the town, alongside freed slaves (App. Pun. 93-5) and resisted pretty stoutly.
In brief, apart from M. Atillius Regulus’ invasion of 256, each time Carthaginian Africa is ‘illuminated’ for us we see Carthaginian citizen forces. Now our sources usually current these forces as principally ‘scratch’ forces, raised in a panic, however whereas the Carthaginians generally lose the battles that end result, these armies should not a ‘rabble’ by any means. Carthaginian citizen forces had been evidently enough to defeat their very own mercenaries and the Libyan revolt in 241. At Zama (202), the Carthaginian residents kind the second rank of Hannibal’s military and whereas Polybius is fast to lean into stereotypes calling them cowards (for not reinforcing the primary battle line, composed of mercenary troops), in observe what he truly describes is that the Carthaginian citizen line is ready to throw the Roman hastati again and is barely pressured to retreat by the advance of Scipio’s second line of principes (Polyb. 15.13.5-8).
My suspicion is thus that Carthaginian citizen troopers might have by no means totally gone away, however moderately they might have been confined largely to operations in North Africa. It makes a level of sense that the Carthaginians would possibly need to wage their imperial wars nearly totally with auxiliary troops recruited from their dependencies (or paid for as mercenaries), with Carthaginian residents serving solely as generals and officers, whereas reserving their citizen troopers for operations nearer to house. And there will need to have been extra of such operations than we’re conscious of. Keep in mind: Carthaginian armies actually solely develop into totally seen to us as they work together with Greek and Roman armies, however clearly Carthage will need to have achieved the subjugation of a lot of North Africa, will need to have managed to subordinate (if not subdue) the Numidians, will need to have been in a position to maintain that management by way of army energy (for our sources are very clear that Carthaginian management was usually resented) and eventually will need to have been in a position to additionally deter the Saharan, Berber and Lybian peoples on their borders.
In brief, there’s nearly actually various Carthaginian campaigning in Africa which we are able to’t see clearly and it’s potential that Carthaginian citizen troopers continued to be lively in these operations all through. In that case, Carthage might effectively have saved its citizenry in some extent of readiness for conflict, which can clarify why substantial our bodies of Carthaginian citizen troopers appear to be obtainable and militarily efficient so rapidly when Carthage’s core territory in Africa is threatened. That mentioned, in need of some very handy (and not possible) Punic inscriptions exhibiting up, this stays merely a speculation; our sources provide no trace of this and certainly Polybius states the other, that the Carthaginian citizenry was broadly demilitarized.
Carthaginian Arms and Techniques
After all, if Carthaginian residents did generally battle, that raises a key query: how did Carthaginian residents battle? With what arms and ways?
The primary reply is that our proof is infuriatingly restricted right here. In spite of everything, Carthaginian citizen troopers do most of their combating seen to us comparatively early the place our predominant sources are writers like Diodorus, who – as a result of he’s writing a common historical past protecting every little thing from the earliest mythology (he consists of the Fall of Troy) right down to his personal day (mid-first century B.C.) – hardly ever offers a number of particulars. Usually we would complement this with visible proof in art work or gear deposited in graves, however there’s very, very little of this. That time has generally been taken to replicate Carthage’s ‘unmilitary’ character, however it’s price noting that previous to 146, now we have equally little archaeological or representational proof of the Roman Republic’s armies and nobody accuses the Romans of being ‘unmilitary’ in character.
What proof we do have means that the Carthaginians largely fought as heavy soldiers in a way not too totally different from Greek hoplites. Now I need to caveat that instantly to say this doesn’t imply they fought as hoplites – it’s actually potential however under no circumstances essentially or sure that the Carthaginians might need adopted weapons or ways from the Greeks. The Levant had its personal infantry traditions on which the Carthaginians might need drawn which included heavy armor and huge shields. On the similar time, as famous, it looks as if Phoenician colonies drew in a number of Aegean (learn: Greek) settlers, so it will hardly be stunning of the Carthaginians did undertake Greek armaments.
Nevertheless, I need to pause for a second to attract one level of necessary clarification: at no level did any Carthaginian or any soldier in Carthaginian service that we all know of, battle in a Macedonian-style pike phalanx. The concept the Carthaginians adopted this fashion of combating is predicated totally on outdated mistranslation of lonchophoroi as ‘pikemen’ when in actual fact the lonche is a light-weight spear and these are gentle infantry javelin-men combating in assist of African heavy infantry. We’ll discuss extra about them subsequent week.
We’ve a number of small engravings (small engraved impression seals referred to as ‘scarabs’) from Carthage and Phoenician settlements in Sardinia, which depict troopers and so they present males with massive apparently round shields and spears. Numidian royal monuments, which can be drawing on Carthaginian materials tradition (it will have been excessive standing) function massive spherical shields as a design motif and one intriguing monument, a statue base excavated in Rome, has been supposed by Ann Kuttner to presumably be a Numidian comission exhibiting Numidian arms (or maybe the captured arms of Carthaginians?) and reveals a big spherical defend of the identical kind seen on their royal monumnets, alongside tube-and-yoke cuirasses (two of that are arrange as trophies) and plumed helmets of the pilos/konos kind (a sort of Hellenistic Greek helmet). And our literary sources recurrently describe the Carthaginians as forming heavy infantry battle strains (utilizing the phrase φάλαγξ, phalanx, to explain them) and report Carthaginians as sporting helmets and armor, with massive shields and spears.
On that foundation, each Gregory Daly and Joshua Corridor (each op. cit.) conclude that the Carthaginians will need to have fought moderately lots like Greek hoplites and I feel that is each principally right and possibly one of the best we are able to do. By the Punic Wars, now we have hints that Carthaginian troops (each citizen and topic from North Africa) might also be adopting Italic gear, which I’ll get into extra within the subsequent submit: by the tip of the Second Punic Struggle and positively by the Third Punic Struggle, Carthaginian troopers might have seemed truly fairly ‘Roman’ of their equipment.
All of that mentioned, as is clear from the forces Carthage arrayed for the Punic Wars, Carthaginian armies included excess of simply citizen troopers – certainly, many Carthaginian armies evidently included few if any Carthaginian residents outdoors of the officer corps. So to higher perceive Carthage’s armies, we’re going to should department out to consider their different forces, which we’ll start to do subsequent week.
