Historical Mediterranean Mercenaries! – A Assortment of Unmitigated Pedantry

This week we’re going to try mercenaries within the historical Mediterranean world! This was one of many runners-up within the newest ACOUP Senate ballot, popping out of fairly a number of requests to debate how mercenaries functioned in antiquity. As a way to preserve the scope right here manageable and inside my experience, I’m going to restrict myself to mercenaries within the Classical (480-323) and Hellenistic (323-31) Mediterranean, however we’ll have greater than sufficient to speak about inside that framework.

Mercenary troopers make frequent appearances in our sources for these durations and consequently additionally are sometimes outstanding in trendy representations of warfare within the historical Mediterranean, exhibiting up, as an example, as a normal characteristic of technique video games (Rome: Whole Battle; Imperator, and so on.) set within the interval. That mentioned, whereas our sources usually notice the presence of mercenaries, the precise mechanics – who serves, how are they recruited, how are they paid and so forth – are sometimes extra obscure (although not totally so!). So that’s what we’re going to deal with right here, not an exhaustive record of each identified mercenary outfit in antiquity (you possibly can seek the advice of the quick bibliography beneath for that) however reasonably a top level view of the topic with a deal with mechanics.

I do wish to notice there are two issues I couldn’t slot in right here. The primary was an entire dialogue of the Carthaginian military and the totally different troopers who served in it. We’re going to do this, however not right here and never straight away (this 12 months, although, I believe). The second is that I do probably not get into right here how particular mercenary troops fought – Tarantine cavalry techniques, Cretan archery, thureophoroi and so forth. We’ve mentioned a few of that, really, in our therapy of Hellenistic armies, however the remainder of it must wait for one more day. In my protection, this put up is already 7,600 phrases lengthy.

However first, as all the time, when you like what you might be studying right here, please share it; when you actually prefer it, you possibly can assist me on Patreon; members on the Patres et Matres Conscripti degree get to vote on the matters for post-series like this one! If you would like updates every time a brand new put up seems or wish to hear my extra bite-sized musings on historical past, safety affairs and present occasions, you possibly can comply with me on Bluesky (@bretdevereaux.bsky.social). I’m additionally lively on Threads (bretdevereaux) and preserve a de minimis presence on Twitter (@bretdevereaux).

(Additional Studying Be aware: For a very very long time, the usual references on this subject had been H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Troopers from the Earliest Occasions to the Battle of Ipsus (1933) and G.T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (1935). Lately, Parke has largely been changed as a reference by M. Trundle, Greek Mercenaries: from the late archaic interval to Alexander (2004), whereas Griffith stays the usual reference for mercenary service within the Hellenistic interval. For a considerably broader however nonetheless Mediterranean focus, S. Yalichev, Mercenaries of the Historical World (1997) presents numerous protection. Be aware additionally S. English, Mercenaries within the Classical World to the Loss of life of Alexander (2012), which is a type of examples of a fairly stable e-book languishing as a Pen & Sword title; I’d say Trundle is to be most well-liked to English, however the latter is not at all dangerous – I detected no nice or horrible errors in it and it might be simpler to come up with.)

Defining Mercenaries

Nonetheless earlier than we are able to even dive into outlining mercenary service in antiquity, we have to make clear precisely who we imply once we focus on mercenaries. One of many challenges in discussing mercenaries is that a few of our sources – most notably Polybius – are intentionally slippery with their use of phrases. Consequently, it’s usually very simple to finish up in a scenario the place a translation (faithfully translated!) describes a given set of troopers as ‘mercenaries’ who are usually not, by trendy definitions, mercenaries in any respect! Certainly, a lot of the notion of ‘mercenary armies’ evaporates once we really examine the situations beneath which many of those so-called ‘mercenaries’ had been recruited.

The primarily offender here’s a Greek phrase, μισθοφόρος (misthophoros), which is commonly translated as ‘mercenary’ and certainly had that that means in antiquity, however our sources – once more, significantly Polybius – play quick and unfastened with the broad that means of the time period and the slim that means. The slim that means of misthophoros is that of a mercenary soldier – a soldier serving purely for pay with no actual attachment to the state they combat for – however the broad that means is its literal one: ‘wage-bearing’ (a μισθός being a wage, distinct from σίτος or σιτώνιον, each actually “bread [money/supply]” and thus ‘primary upkeep’ – μισθός is pay in extra of primary upkeep). So whereas a misthophoros might be a international mercenary serving for pay – that misthos – they might equally be a home soldier who, for no matter purpose, was paid a wage.

When we consider mercenaries, we usually consider international troopers combating for a rustic for the sake of cash, reasonably than any dedication to the trigger. Greek authors can simply make this clear by describing troopers as ξενικός, (xenikos, ‘international’), however they usually don’t or blur these classes. The difficulty is that, in fact many troopers who are usually not mercenaries would possibly nonetheless be paid a wage in extra of primary upkeep.

And that brings us to Polybius, the worst offender within the ‘fudging the definition of mercenaries’ class. Polybius is famously the supply for the declare that Carthage’s armies had been each “international” (xenikos) and “mercenary” (misthophoros). Generations of readers and students have carelessly accepted that description however it’s basically a deception. This isn’t the place to totally describe the Carthaginian navy system (I focus on this extra in my e-book mission!) however the spine of Carthaginian armies had been infantry drawn from Carthage’s North African territories. Polybius is completely satisfied to explain these fellows as misthophoroi and let his readership comply with his lead into assuming the slim (‘mercenary’) definition, which is fallacious, reasonably than the broad definition (‘wage-bearing’) the place he’s correct.

Polybius hardly ever lies to your face, however he completely bends phrases and info to make his arguments appear extra believable. Specifically, Polybius is seeking to arrange a distinction between what he views because the inferiority of Carthage’s ‘mercenary’ armies as in comparison with the martial excellence and ethical purity of Rome’s armies of citizen troopers. So he desires to emphasise the mercenary nature of Carthage’s armies and reduce the identical about Rome.

However right here’s how these North African troops had been organized. Carthage had expanded its management over many communities in North Africa and evidently alongside the taxes they needed to pay to Carthage, a part of subordination was that they had been answerable for conscription. When Carthaginian generals raised armies, after enrolling any Carthaginian citizen volunteers, they’d head out into Carthage’s African topic communities and conscript troops (ἐπιλέγειν, ‘to pick’) from these communities. These conscripts had been then evidently paid a wage for his or her service and appear to have functioned one thing like semi-professional forces, usually serving on fairly lengthy campaigns. These are usually not mercenaries by our definition! They don’t seem to be international, however reasonably topic communities being conscripted from inside the territory that Carthage managed – not very totally different from how Rome raised the forces of the socii (the principle distinction being Rome made the socii communities pay their troopers; Carthage taxes its topics after which pays the troopers out of these taxes).

Likewise, we all know that early on in Carthaginian historical past, the Carthaginians recruited Iberian troopers – males from the Mediterranean coast of Spain – as mercenaries for his or her armies. Honest sufficient. However by the Second Punic Battle (218-201), Carthage – or extra appropriately the Barcids – management the Iberian homelands in Spain. The Barcids – Hamilcar, his son-in-law Hasdrubal the Honest and organic son Hannibal – have moved in with a military, defeated the locals and set themselves up primarily as ‘warlords of warlords’ in a non-state navy hierarchy. So when Hannibal and his brother Hasdrubal (totally different Hasdrubal) increase completely huge numbers of Iberians to combat for them, these aren’t mercenaries both, however the native navy forces of what are primarily Hannibal’s vassal warlords (what the Romans time period reguli, ‘petty kings’). At this level, these Iberians are forces once more inner to Carthage’s empire.

In the meantime Hannibal’s Gauls are additionally principally not mercenaries however reasonably they perceive their polities to be allies of Carthage in a joint struggle in opposition to Rome which Hannibal is main, one thing made clear within the treaty Carthage makes with Philip V of Macedon, which specifies these allied forces. Underneath that framework comparatively few of Carthage’s troopers within the Second Punic Battle are literally mercenaries! As a substitute, Carthage’s military is a patchwork of subject-community conscripts, native allies, vassal levies and troops raised by particular person generals by private relationships – a system that’s extra akin to the Roman military than another pressure within the Mediterranean.

However saying that does nothing for Polybius’ arguments both about Roman martial advantage or his glorification of the Roman citizen-soldier superb (which one reasonably will get the impression he thinks the Greeks again house should undertake), so he – with out ever fairly mendacity – lets the reader consider Carthage’s armies are principally mercenaries and because of this they’re much less efficient within the subject (Polyb. 6.52). It’s a definitional fudge to intensify the distinction.

It isn’t even the one time Polybius performs this trick! In his description of the Ptolemaic military on the Battle of Raphia, Polybius (5.65.6) teams collectively the cavalry ‘from Greece’ (precise mercenaries from Greece employed by the Ptolemies) with the ‘mercenary [misthophoroi] cavalry’ in a single unit, making it sound like it is a single unit of mercenary cavalry from Greece and elsewhere. However the truth is the misthophoroi hippeis, ‘wage-bearing cavalry’ are a well-attested unit of Greek-speaking navy settlers in Egypt serving as cavalry. Polybius’ narrative is one wherein the moribund Ptolemaic military is whipped into form however a set of mercenary Greek commanders (Polyb. 5.63.8-14), a recent infusion of Greek martial spirit into the military and this fudge lets him make it appear that whereas the ‘native’ (Macedonian) Ptolemaic cavalry on the left was wholly defeated it, the battle was received by the – he’ll let the reader perceive incorrectly, principally mercenary – cavalry on the suitable, when the truth is a lot of the cavalry on the suitable is additionally ‘native’ Greek-speaking cavalry from Egypt.

In follow, Ptolemaic victory at Raphia appears to rely much more on the truth that, having finally included native Egyptians into the phalanx, the Ptolemies arrive on the sphere with nearly twice as many heavy infantry phalangites because the Seleucids, forcing Antiochus III to attempt to oppose the Egyptian phalanx with a lot lighter forces, to his misfortune.

The results of all of that is we have to be fairly cautious about how we outline ‘mercenaries’ in historical armies, since our sources are very slippery with their phrases, typically prepared to time period any troopers paid a wage past primary upkeep – even when native to the state they combat for – mercenaries. Specifically, once we say mercenaries, we imply troopers recruited from outdoors a given state, serving for pay. That’s to say, these are usually not domestically recruited skilled troopers (just like the legions within the Roman imperial interval) or domestically recruited non-citizen auxiliaries (just like the imperial Roman auxilia or Egyptians within the Ptolemaic military) or allied forces combating in a military as a result of their very own state is a celebration to the battle (like Hannibal’s Gauls or Eumenes II’s Pergamon troops at Magnesia) or vassal levies current as a result of their very own polity is subordinated to the principle get together within the struggle (just like the Roman socii or Hannibal’s Iberians). All of these troopers are notionally combating for the state to which they belong. We would like troopers combating purely for cash, for a state to which they don’t belong.

That mentioned, there have been completely mercenaries by this definition in service within the historical Mediterranean, so lets speak about them!

Early Mercenaries

Our proof for mercenaries in broader historical Mediterranean world previous to the Classical interval is sort of skinny, however definitely suggests – as we’d anticipate – that the career is an outdated one, maybe as outdated because the state itself. Now we have proof, as an example, of foreigners on the standing royal guard of Sargon of Akkad (r. 2334-2279), together with a unit of Amorites (a international individuals), which would appear to counsel the hiring of mercenaries even at this early level. We are able to’t make sure why Sargon resorted to international troopers, however it might effectively have been the identical purpose that many kings by historical past maintained international, mercenary bodguards: a guard of international mercenaries would lack any political connections, making them notionally totally reliant on the king for his or her standing and thus extra loyal. Likewise we have now some proof from the Previous Kingdom onward of Nubians in Egyptian navy service who had been most likely mercenaries and even a tomb inscription commemorating an Egyptian Harkhuf who introduced again – amongst different items – mercenaries for the Egyptian King Merenre Nemtyemsaf I (r. c. 2300) from his commerce expeditions into Nubia, an early mercenary-recruiter.

Greeks appear to have served as mercenaries throughout the Japanese Mediterranean from an early level as effectively – we have now proof for Ionian Greeks, seemingly on mercenary service, in Babylon and for Greeks in Egyptian mercenary service by the seventh century. We frequently can not see these early mercenaries very effectively – their phrases of service, strategies of recruitment and so forth are obscured to us by the restricted proof – however they function a helpful reminder that mercenary service was not invented within the Classical interval (480-323) when it turns into more and more seen to us.

That mentioned, I wish to deal with how historical mercenaries would possibly operate within the Classical (480-323) and Hellenistic (323-31) durations as a result of that is the place my experience is finest.

Recruiting Mercenaries

The very first thing that’s price stressing right here is that we shouldn’t consider the traditional Mediterranean world in both the Classical or Hellenistic durations as having one thing like a single linked ‘mercenary market’ that each one states had entry to. As a substitute, mercenary recruitment was usually extremely localized, with every state gaining access to totally different regional ‘swimming pools’ of manpower they might rent. This limitation is considerably obscured by the tendency each in our sources and in trendy scholarship to deal with Greek mercenaries, which might be considerably misleading just because the Aegean ‘mercenary market’ was the one that nearly each central or japanese Mediterranean state had some entry to. However that is only a sophisticated means of claiming that the states which had contact with Greece (and thus are of concern to our Greek sources) had contact with Greece (and had been thus in a position to contract mercenaries there).

There’s a tendency within the widespread creativeness to picture mercenaries functioning as a wholly separate ‘pool’ of manpower from ‘common armies.’ That’s how they operate in most technique video games, as an example. However in follow, in fact, the provision of males in any of those societies in a position to equip themselves to combat – one thing that demanded both a level of wealth or social standing – was all the time restricted. A ruler recruiting mercenaries was thus reaching into the ‘manpower pool’ of different polities, typically in comparable methods to how these polities would themselves have recruited their residents. So the query right here is basically how does a pacesetter achieve entry to the navy manpower provide of a international polity?

In follow there have been two fundamental strategies. The primary and best was by diplomacy: a ruler would possibly, as a result of they already had an current diplomatic relationship with one other energy, be capable of negotiate entry to the navy inhabitants (nonetheless composed socially and economically) that their pleasant neighbor managed. For a lot of the Classical interval specifically, friendship with Sparta acted as the important thing that unlocked entry to Greek mercenaries from the Peloponnese – with varied Mediterranean powers being comparatively keen to rent Greek mercenaries presumably as a result of the Greek type of heavy infantry fight had proved fairly efficient throughout the Greco-Persian Wars (492-478).

Thus as an example in 380, when each Egypt (beneath the Pharoah Hakor (r. 392-379)) – having revolted from Persian management in 404 – and the Persians had been searching for Greek mercenaries, they each courted Athens for entry to them: the Egyptians reached out to the Athenian basic Chabrias to command a pressure for them and the Persians responded by sending envoys encouraging the Athenians to recall Chabrias and as a substitute ship the final Iphicrates to place collectively a pressure for them (Diod. Sic. 15.29.1-4). Likewise, when the Egyptian king – Egypt having revolted from Persian management in 404 – Nectanebo I (r. 379-360) wished to lift a pressure of Greek mercenaries in c. 361 he did so immediately by one of many Spartan kings, Agesilaus II (Xen. Ages. 2.28-31). This was hardly solely a recreation for non-Greeks: Dionysius I, Tyrant of Syracuse (r. 406-367) used his pleasant relationship with Sparta to enlist substantial numbers of mercenaries from the Greek mainland to complement his Sicilian-Greek military (Diod. Sic. 14.44.2).

The above, in fact, is hardly an exhaustive record. That mentioned, as you may think, it’s usually actually difficult to separate this sort of mercenary recruitment – the place the mercenaries are typically coming beneath the management of a ‘mercenary captain’ who’s additionally a political chief in one other state – from allied or vassal forces. I preserve saying we have to focus on the Carthaginian military one other time (we are going to, I promise), however Carthage recruits this fashion on a regular basis, with Carthaginian generals sustaining pleasant relationships with Numidian princes or Iberian warlords who they will then name upon for troopers – the road between a mercenary pressure, an allied pressure or a vassal pressure will get terribly blurry in these type of conditions. You could have some clear examples of mercenaries drawn up this fashion – the 4,000 Celtiberians raised by Hasdrubal Gisco, as an example are clearly exterior mercenaries (Polyb. 1.67.7), the Celtiberian Meseta being outdoors of Carthage’s political management – however different examples, like the two,000 Numidians Hamilcar Barca will get in change for a pledge to marry his daughter to the Numidian prince Naravas appear to be extra allies-and-vassals than mercenaries (Polyb. 1.78.1-9).

These traces may even blur over time: early on Carthage is sending ambassadors to Spain to barter for mercenaries utilizing commerce items (Diod. Sic. 13.44.6, 13.80.2) in what’s clearly the type of mercenaries-recruited-through-diplomacy relationship, which seems to be how Carthage recruits Iberians at the least by 241 (Polyb. 1.66-7). However then in fact the Barcids go and conquer the place and so post-237 the Iberians we see in Carthage’s military – most likely the most important single manpower supply within the Second Punic Battle (218-201) – are usually not exterior mercenaries however reasonably inner vassal levies, raised by native warlords who’ve been subjugated by the Barcids.

Once more, I promise we’ll speak about Carthage’s navy machine intimately. Later.

For leaders who couldn’t take the expedient of recruiting mercenaries immediately by the state equipment like this, the alternate methodology was to recruit mercenaries by the dispatch of a ‘mercenary captain,’ although I ought to be clear that ‘mercenary captain’ was not usually a specialised profession – these tended to be precisely the identical type of males who would possibly maintain excessive workplace (like that of basic) in a Greek polis or be main elites with retinues in a non-state polity. Typically these specific males may be politically on the outs, in exile, or in comparable situations – which might put them within the court docket of a international chief who would possibly belief them and wish the usage of their skills – however in fact they retained the type of expertise, affect and connections to place out the decision for combating males in a given area or inside a given polity.

The basic instance of this type of recruitment, rendered unusually seen to us by Xenophon’s report of it, was the recruitment of the ten,000 by Cyrus the Youthful for his try on the throne of Persia in 401. Cyrus recruited his mercenary pressure in various separate detachments to hide his preparations for civil struggle. His personal territory – he was satrap in Asia Minor – included the poleis of Ionia, the place he recruited domestically (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6), however to complement this Cyrus used his connections to make use of various outstanding Greeks as mercenary recruiters and captains. He sends Clearchus, a Spartan exile into Greece with a big sum of cash to recruit troops (feigning that they had been for a struggle in Thrace, Xen. Anab. 1.1.9) within the Chersonese (however most likely drawing primarily Peloponnesians). To Thessaly, he despatched Aristippus, a Thessalian in political difficulties to recruit there (Xen. Anab. 1.1.10); to Boeotia a Boeotian named Proxenus and in Achaea two Achaeans named Symphalian and Socrates (Xen. Anab. 1.1.11). Once more, what we’re instructed about these fellows implies they had been all males of native political significance, who had develop into mates (learn: political allies) of Cyrus and so by giving them entry to his cash Cyrus might use them to entry the manpower pool of Greece.

The system of recruitment doesn’t actually change all that a lot for mercenary recruitment outdoors of Greece or later within the Hellenistic interval. As Griffith notes, for the key Hellenistic powers, entry to Greek manpower was an necessary strategic consideration and so the relations of those Macedonian dynasts with pleasant Greek cities usually included guarantees to permit free transit for mercenary recruiters (ξενόλογοι) of their territory and to bar the identical from the king’s enemies. Equally, we frequently see the looks of males who – though we don’t get the element Xenophon offers us for the early leaders of the ten,000 – look like the identical type of mercenary recruiters mentioned above. Thus as an example we get the roster of mercenary captains concerned in getting ready the Ptolemaic military for Raphia: Echecrates from Thessaly, Phoxidas of Melita, Eurylochus the Magnesian, Socrates the Boeotian and Cnopias of Allaria (Polyb. 5.63.11-12). In 203, Ptolemy V’s court docket dispatches an Aetolian mercenary captain, Scopas, to his native nation in an effort to recruit extra Greeks (Polyb. 15.25.16).

Sources of Mercenaries

Given these two main technique of having access to sources of males prepared to combat for pay – both utilizing diplomatic channels to achieve entry or using a neighborhood notable who already has entry – it’s not exhausting to see why every state or chief goes to have entry to totally different ‘swimming pools’ of mercenaries, primarily based on who’s of their court docket out there and sufficiently reliable to be tasked to do mercenary recruiting or on what diplomatic preparations they’ve. On the latter level, whereas in some circumstances these diplomatic preparations are primarily between states and principally treaty preparations, you’ll notice above in lots of circumstances they’re basically private in nature: not simply ‘is your state pleasant with Sparta’ however ‘do you, personally, have a relationship with, or a strategy to contact a key chief like Agesilaus II personally to have him dealer the association.

That mentioned within the Hellenistic Mediterranean there are so very ‘customary’ sources of mercenaries we see present up continuously in numerous armies. The obvious and protracted one is Greeks, significantly Greeks from the Aegean – that’s, mainland Greece, the Aegean Islands and Ionia. Alexander the Nice’s conquests and the states that his empire fragmented into meant that successfully each main Japanese Mediterranean energy was Greek-speaking with substantial cultural and private ties in Greece. As a result of these kingdoms relied considerably on a ruling class made as much as at the least a point (primarily made up within the case of the 2 largest, Ptolemic Egypt and the Seleucid Kingdom) by Greek navy settlers meant that that they had a rapacious demand for these fellows. However on the identical time, for states whose capitals (Alexandria, Seleucia-on-the-Tigris and the Syrian tetrapolis (which included Seleucia Pieria and Antioch)) had been new, massive Greek-speaking city foundations with a river of royal cash flowing by them, it meant that any Hellenistic ruler had an ample provide of the type of fellows who might be despatched with a bunch of money (or guarantees of money) to Greece to place out the decision to enlist males.

Certainly, when you had been such a fellow from Greece – a politically necessary exile or an skilled navy commander on the outs – the apparent place to go was one of many Hellenistic capitals, whose kings might pay you lavishly in your talents and connections.

The odd results of this persistent demand for Greek mercenaries was the very temporary emergence of a set ‘clearing home’ of types for Greek mercenaries within the fourth century: Taenarum (trendy Cape Matapan, on the very southern tip of the Peloponnese). I discover that college students of antiquity usually assume, encountering Taenarum on this operate, that it should have been considered one of many such ‘mercenary marketplaces’ however the truth is it actually does appear to be the one spot fairly prefer it. It was hardly the one place to recruit mercenaries, however it’s the solely place the place it looks as if massive numbers of potential mercenaries merely frolicked, ready to be recruited. It appears to have crammed this position from at the least the 320s onward (see Diod. Sic. 17.108.7, 17.111.1). That mentioned, Taenarum itself appears to have light in significance and we get no references to it persevering with as a mercenary rallying level within the third century, nor does another place take up its position. As a substitute, the recruitment of Greeks largely continues alongside the traces above: by diplomacy or recruiting captains.

A notable sub-component of Greek mercenaries had been items of ‘Cretan’ or ‘Neo-Cretan’ troops. These appear invariably to be archer mercenaries, though it’s not all the time clear if ‘Creten’ right here signifies them being from Crete or skilled to combat within the Cretan method. Nonetheless such troopers present up with regularity within the armies of Alexander, the Antigonids, the Ptolmies, the Seleucids and the states of Greece correct, inter alia. That is one factor that’s difficult in assessing mercenary items: they’re nearly all the time described with an ethnic marker, however it’s typically unclear if this means the place the boys are from, or how they combat or each.

The character of polis armies clearly has one thing to do with why the Greek world appears to produce mercenaries, maybe reasonably greater than we’d anticipate. These states, in spite of everything, preserve citizen militia forces with each heavy infantry hoplites (a lot in demand) and lighter infantry troops (peltasts within the Classical interval, thureophoroi within the Hellenistic). Since these fellows all self-equip, meaning in peacetime there isn’t a scarcity of males with the required gear and expertise to fill these battlefield roles who would possibly – both out of a need for journey or the necessity for the cash – be tempted into mercenary service. The turmoil of polis politics should even have usually thrown off these males after they discovered themselves on the fallacious aspect of a political restructuring of their neighborhood – and naturally it would even have produced no scarcity of exiled or politically unpopular generals and captains to arrange them.

We shouldn’t overstate their numbers: Greece was not awash with tens of 1000’s of mercenaries. It’s placing that when Cyrus the Youthful primarily makes an attempt to recruit everybody he can in 401, he finally ends up with 10,000 of them. For the Battle of Raphia (217), when Antiochus III, the Seleucid King, and Ptolemy IV (of Egypt) primarily each attempt to recruit everybody they will get their arms on, the Seleucids have 5,000 Greek mercenaries and one other 1,000 Cretans and the Ptolemies have round 8,000 Greek mercenaries and one other 1,000-3,000 Cretans and Neo-Cretans (some variety of whom could also be settlers) for a complete of one thing like perhaps 3,000 or so Cretans and 13,000 Greek mercenaries out there. So we’d say one thing to the impact that after 404 or so, there have been round 10,000 to fifteen,000 or so mercenaries out there available within the Greek world. Clearly not a small quantity, but in addition not a quantity so massive that one might predicate a whole main military on them (however a lot for a small polis to determine they might get away with a principally mercenary military and spare the wealthy residents the annoyance of hoplite service, as some appear to have achieved).

One other key supply of mercenaries had been non-state or early/weak-state peoples caught within the orbit of those massive kingdoms. We’ve talked about how ‘tribal’ polities – which typically consolidated into weak kingdoms (e.g. Odrysian Thrace) – recruit internally by the networks of particular person highly effective aristocrats (with their retinues). That risky combination means these societies have a bunch of native notables who might doubtlessly increase a big quantity of navy pressure for a non-public agenda, whose energy and affect is partly primarily based on their potential to display martial valor. On the identical time, these males even have sons, the ‘youths’ in our sources who even have a social must display navy advantage and who would possibly get greater than a bit ‘antsy’ if there isn’t a battle at current wherein to take action.

In the meantime neighboring states have entry to money (that’s, precise coined cash) and status items that these non-state/weak-state societies – with much less financial specialization – usually don’t produce. These status items are fairly invaluable for aristocrats (and their sons) within the non-state societies as a result of they will use them to display their very own wealth and connections or as invaluable items to retainers. The potential for a state to leverage that to recruit these aristocrats – with their retinues – as mercenaries are pretty apparent and thru this interplay mercenaries from these societies develop into a normal characteristic of Mediterranean armies within the Hellenistic interval.

Carthage, in fact, has essentially the most notable status for this sort of recruitment, recruiting substantial numbers of Iberians and Gauls this fashion, earlier than Barcid growth in Spain and Hannibal’s invasion of Italy basically change these relationships right into a non-mercenary character (Diod. Sic. 13.44, 13.80; Polyb. 1.17.4, 1.67.7). As an apart as a result of this suits nowhere else, Carthage additionally appears to have been in a position to entry at the least some sources of Greek mercenaries, however one will get the sense these had been by no means a serious a part of their manpower pool.

The three main Hellenistic powers utilized these sources as effectively, with essentially the most constant non-state/weak-state mercenary attracts being Gauls and Thracians. The Seleucids additionally frequently employed Gallic mercenaries, however whereas Carthage’s Gauls had been drawn from what right now would by southern France and northern Italy, the Seleucid provide got here from the Galatians, a Gallic individuals who had migrated from the decrease Danube by Greece (fairly violently) earlier than settling in central Anatolia; some 3,000 infantry and a couple of,500 cavalry of this type are a part of the Seleucid array at Magnesia. The Ptolemies, ready within the third century to mission substantial naval energy of the Japanese Mediterranean, additionally employed smaller numbers of Gallic and Thracian mercenaries, which present up on the solely Ptolemaic order of battle we have now, the one for Raphia. The Antigonids, controlling the Macedonian heartland – which is subsequent to Thrace and Gallic peoples within the Danube River Basin – additionally employed substantial numbers of those as mercenaries. Perseus (r. 179-168) when he introduced his entire military collectively for evaluation, had 2,000 Gauls and three,000 ‘free’ Thracians (together with 2,000 allied Thracians from the Odrysian Kingdom) in his military, alongside 3,000 Cretan mercenaries and round 1,000 Greeks from varied locations.

Different sources of mercenaries seem solely briefly in our sources reasonably than exhibiting up constantly. The Seleucid King Demetrios I recruited Jewish mercenaries (I. Macc. 10.36). The Seleucids additionally employed a considerable variety of troops from areas across the edges of their empire – Dahae, Thallians, Carians, Cilicians – who may be mercenaries however in lots of circumstances would possibly equally by topics or vassals (Livy 37.40). The Mamertines, who will find yourself beginning the First Punic Battle had been a physique of Campanian mercenaries who had been employed by Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse (r. 317 – 289) and afterwords set themselves up because the rulers of Messina in Sicily.

That mentioned, Italy is notable by the way it doesn’t throw off massive numbers of mercenaries (neither does Carthaginian North Africa, as soon as we lower by Polybius’ fudging). The Carthaginians make use of some mercenaries (however once more, fewer than usually supposed), however they don’t appear to permit anybody else to actually rent from their very own recruiting swimming pools, whereas the Romans largely don’t make use of any significant variety of mercenaries and likewise seem to maintain their navy assets locked up. The truth that the Roman Republic is basically a non-actor within the mercenary market – neither a provider nor a client – is remarkably placing, although it makes a level of sense once you do not forget that the Roman military-economic machine generated troopers in super amount (with their gear) however comparatively little exhausting money. Why pay for the one factor you could have in abundance? The extra curious query is why nobody else tries (or succeeds?) to rent Romans. In any case, Rome and Carthage each appear notably to not generate the type of ‘floating provide’ of mercenary navy males that Greece does.

Phrases of Service

We are able to conclude very briefly with a way of how mercenaries would possibly serve and be paid.

For essentially the most half, once we hear about mercenaries, they’re being raised for particular campaigns, however on occasion we get hints of standing our bodies of mercenary troops as effectively. I’ve already talked about mercenary royal guards, however we additionally see mercenaries serving as successfully garrison forces for states they didn’t wish to preserve their citizen-militia or military-settler inhabitants (raised for main campaigns) ‘in rotation’ in peacetime. The Ptolemies appear to have maintained substantial garrisons this fashion – we’re instructed in preparation for the Battle of Raphia that the advisors of Ptolemy IV put collectively a pressure of some eight thousand mercenaries which appear to principally have been drawn from garrison responsibility, significantly in Ptolemaic abroad holdings (Polyb. 5.65.4). Apparently, we additionally see the Greek poleis, nonetheless combating their smaller wars within the shadows of Hellenistic giants, typically elevating small standing items of paid citizen troopers they usually typically employed mercenaries (Athens fairly continuously), however the impression, typically given within the older scholarship that the Hellenistic interval was an age of Greek warfare-by-condottieri is overblown: citizen troopers remained the mainstay of polis forces.

Mercenaries appear usually to have served in outlined items beneath the captains who recruited them. In our sources, these items usually present up with ethnic signifiers, which frequently point out each the place mercenaries had been from and likewise how they fought. Mercenaries had been anticipated to offer their very own gear for a selected type of combating, which naturally restricted who might be a mercenary. In the event you wished to be a hoplite mercenary, you wanted to have hoplite gear! Nonetheless this meant mercenary forces might be a means for a state to ‘purchase’ a type of warfare it couldn’t produce successfully itself, with the obvious instance – however hardly the one one- being the Persian urge for food for Greek heavy infantry.

The exact phrases of fee different and had been usually negotiated and typically renegotiated as campaigns wore on. Sadly, we can not see the fee phrases of principally any non-Greek mercenaries clearly, so we’re largely at the hours of darkness about how Iberian, Thracian, Gallic, and so on. mercenaries had been paid. Diodorus’ indication that Carthaginian mercenary recruiters went to Spain μετὰ πολλῶν χρημάτων, “with a number of stuff” is irritating in its vagueness, since χρήματα might equally be commerce items or precise coined cash (Diod. Sic. 13.44.6). What’s, I believe, pretty clear is that Carthage isn’t – tempo Hoyos – paying their mercenaries practically as a lot or in the identical means because the Hellenistic states of the East, if for no different purpose than their price range most likely couldn’t assist it.

Against this, we are able to see the preparations for the pay of Greek mercenaries pretty effectively. Compensation, whereas topic to negotiation usually got here in two parts: what we’d time period ‘upkeep’ (σίτος, ‘bread [money]’ within the Classical interval, σιτώνιον or σιταρχία typically in Hellenistic sources, with the identical that means), primarily an allowance for the soldier to outlive, and the precise wages for labor (μισθός, ‘wages’ or ὀψώνιον, ”relish [money] ‘wage,’ actually ‘relish cash,’ from ὄψον, ‘relish, delicacies, sauces’ – something used to go along with bread to make a tasty meal – making ὀψώνιον splendidly evocative phrase, primarily ‘pay for the nicer issues in life’).

Naturally, the upkeep pay needed to be dealt with at the least slightly bit prematurely and needed to be doled out to any type of soldier in installments as their service progressed. Any type of wage fee in our sources is sort of all the time expressed as a every day sum, however mercenaries most likely didn’t obtain their σιτώνιον each day however most likely in bigger pay durations. These bills might, in fact, be dealt with in two methods: mercenaries would possibly obtain an allowance with which to purchase rations from native markets (in money that is the slim that means of σιτώνιον) or, in fact, they may be issued rations and different primary provides, which works by the time period σιτομετρία (actually ‘measured bread’ however actually ‘rations’).

Against this Greek and Macedonian troopers anticipated wages – the μισθός – to be paid in money, particularly in silver. Whereas upkeep pay got here prematurely (albeit typically in installments), μισθός got here on the finish – both of a pay-period or a marketing campaign. The best strategy to deal with wage bills was to maintain them ‘on the books:’ troopers had been issued their upkeep pay at common intervals however merely had their precise wages credited to their account – the thought being that troopers would then be ‘cashed out’ on the finish of the marketing campaign. That freed the military (and the troopers) from the necessities to hold big quantities of minted silver coinage with them wherever they went…however in fact additionally gave the employer all types of cheeky alternatives to withhold or delay fee. Generals would possibly usually promise to discover the cash for wages from the loot and spoils of a profitable marketing campaign (e.g. the Spartan Teleutias, Xen. Hell. 5.1.14-18); this labored fantastically effectively when you fought for Alexander the Nice and maybe much less so when you fought for principally anybody else.

We are able to see the plain catch that system creates within the begin of Carthage’s Mercenary Battle (241-237; Polyb. 1.66-72). Underneath the phrases of the peace on the finish of the First Punic Battle (264-241), Carthage had withdrawn its military from Sicily and introduced it again to North Africa, however Carthage was financially exhausted by the struggle and caught in a bind: the marketing campaign being over, it now needed to settle the arrears of the boys’s pay. These arrears had been appreciable – this had been a actually lengthy struggle – and Carthage merely didn’t have the cash. The Carthaginians initially are in a position to kick the can down the highway by scraping collectively cash for the upkeep pay – they will scrape collectively the σιτώνιον – however absent the power to pay the arrears of μισθός, the military – each mercenaries and likewise common North African troopers (who made up the majority of the pressure, however had been paid a wage as effectively) – mutinied after which backed a revolt of Carthage’s topic communities in North Africa, which was ultimately put down by Hamilcar Barca.

For a mercenary employer who discovered himself unable to pay out the silver demanded by his mercenaries, the traditional outcome was both mutiny or the mercenary unit melting away. Nonetheless for bigger states, there was an alternative choice to pay in one thing aside from silver the troopers would settle for and right here the plain candidate was land. This definitely appears to be a big half of what’s taking place with Hellenistic navy settlements: Greek and Macedonian troopers, serving in East (the place Macedonian dynasts have land and peasants in abundance) are being paid on the finish of their service partly by lavish plots of land (usually massive sufficient to dwell as rentier elites, reasonably than as farmers!) presumably in lieu of exhausting money the king won’t be ready to spend. And as an added bonus the land each sustains the former-mercenary-now-settler’s family in perpetuity and on the identical time renders him (and his descendants) answerable for future navy service. That mentioned, such settlements might run into issues: recall that a lot of Alexander the Nice’s less-than-fully-willing navy settlers revolted when he died, searching for to simply go house (Diod. Sic. 18.7.1).

Now we have a number of examples of attested pay charges, invariably for Greek or Macedonian troopers. Whereas upkeep was usually dealt with in form, the usual fee of μισθός for navy service is sort of invariably a drachma (=six obols) a day, which as we’ve famous earlier than was a superb wage – a bit above typical – for a day’s work. The proof for upkeep pay as a money-amount is exceedingly difficult (epigraphic and papyrus proof that always comes with interpretive issues) however 2-3 obols per day appears to be the ‘money worth’ of a mercenary’s upkeep, making a Greek or Macedonian mercenary’s ‘gross pay’ round 8 or 9 obols per day. That was additionally, coincidentally, appears to be about what the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms – competing for the scarce provide of ethnically Greek and Macedonian manpower – appear to have paid their home Greek and Macedonian (however not native) troopers (when you alter for the lighter Ptolemaic foreign money customary). Against this, the Antigonids and Romans, conscripting their very own peasants, appear to have paid them 4 and a couple of obols (=3 Roman asses) per day, respectively.

In case you are questioning why the Seleucids and Ptolemies are ‘overpaying’ so badly for his or her navy manpower…questions answered in my e-book mission! Which I promise will, in some unspecified time in the future, really come out! Probably it would arrive at roughly the identical time your mercenary pay arrears are cashed out.

Nobody is getting wealthy on a drachma a day (plus upkeep), however on the flipside a mercenary serving on a marketing campaign or garrison deployment already had their bills lined and would possibly get to the top with some loot and – as soon as they had been ‘cashed out’ – a chunky pile of very spendable silver. For considerably unmonetized non-state peoples, this may be one of many few methods to get a bit of money, which in flip might be a big standing marker and supply financial and social alternatives in any other case unavailable at house. Assuming your employer really paid your wages, this was not a foul financial cut price.

The rise of Rome introduced a gradual however regular finish to this technique, as a result of the Romans largely didn’t use it and in any case steadily extinguished the entire different states that did. Whereas it’s common to see the armies of the Late Roman Republic or early Imperial interval additionally termed ‘mercenary armies,’ that is known as a misnomer. The armies of the Late Roman Republic had been nonetheless principally citizen-soldier armies, whereas the military Augustus and Tiberius created was a long-service skilled standing military recruited from residents and topics of Rome, not a mercenary pressure. It’s placing that the braggart mercenary soldier – a staple inventory character of Hellenistic comedy – seems in Roman comedy in Plautus’ Miles Gloriosus (set in Ephesus within the Greek world), written within the late third century BC because the Romans are starting to increase past Italy in a two-century run of conquest that can render the braggart mercenary himself a factor of the previous.